Optimal Savings and Foreign Debt Policy with Export Revenue Uncertainty by McCabe, James & Sibley, David
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Discussion Papers Economic Growth Center 
10-1-1972 




Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series 
Recommended Citation 
McCabe, James and Sibley, David, "Optimal Savings and Foreign Debt Policy with Export Revenue 
Uncertainty" (1972). Discussion Papers. 169. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/169 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an 
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, 
please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
ECONO:-TJC r,nJ~WTH CENTER 
YALE UNI'7ERSITY 
Rox 1987, Yale Station 
!~ew Haven, Connecticut 
CENTE~ DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 161 
Ootimal Savings and ~oreifn nebt Policy 




Note: Center Discussion ~apers are ryreliminary materials 
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It has been argued that, in determining the optimal rate foreign 
debt accumulation, one should consider the variability of export earnings, 
in addition to such parameters as the domestic saving rate, the marginal 
propensity to import, and the projected mean export growth rate. 
1 This 
is obvious from the point of view of lending countries in that the possi­
bility of defaulting on debt service payments increases with the variance 
of export revenues. However, the uncertainty associated with variability 
in export revenues may also have an impact on optimal debt policy in the 
case where maximization of the borrowing country's welfare is the sole 
consideration. 
While heuristic arguments have been presented in the foreign debt 
literature sponsored by the World Bank, for a rigorous demonstration of 
this point we must refer to an analogous result in household savings theory. 
The fluctuation in export revenue may be broken down into two components: 
one attributable to random variation in sales an~""~ ~n r~nrlrnii v~~i~tfcn 
in the world price of the exportable. In the case where export sales are 
unaffected by govermnent policy, even though they are random it can be shown 
that, under certain assumptions about risk aversion, the optimal rate of 
debt accumulation will be reduced as export revenues become more uncertain 
and the path of total gross investment remains unchanged. This is true for 
the same reason that the household can be shown to have a precautionary 
demand for savings as a result of uncertainty in wage income. An increase 
1See, for example, Avromovic, !!_ !!.• [1]. 
We express our appreciation to Richard Brecher, Dale. Henderson, Steven 
Salant, Jeffrey Shafer and Joseph Stiglitz for their helpful comments. 
2 
in net foreign capital inflow allows the borrowing country_ to consume more 
in the current period (with total gross investment fixed) but also results 
in greater debt service payments and lower consumption in subsequent time 
periods, which are associated with uncertainty in the level of export revenues. 
Since the variance of consumption is an increasing function of the variance 
of the export revenues, there may well be a precautionary motive for decreasing 
the rate of debt accumulation when export revenues become more uncertain 
(although their projected mean rate of increase remains constant). Debt 
accumulation is simply dis-savings, and a rise in export uncertainty in an 
aggregate model creates an effect on optimal net foreign inflow which is 
exactly opposite to the increase in the household's precautionary savings 
demand induced by future wage income becoming more uncertain. By means of 
a two-period optimization mode, Leland has shown that precautionary savings 
increase with uncertainty when the household utility function has the property 
of diminishing absolute risk aversion [5]. 
Aside from presenting the aggregate debt accumulation version of 
this model in detail, we shall demonstrate in this paper that the dampening 
effect of export-revenue uncertainty on foreign borrowing is critically 
dependent on the assumed exogenous and policy variables, and the parameteri­
zation of the utility function. For example, one important variable assumed 
to be exogenous in the preceding discussion, in addition to export revenues, 
is investment. 
Debt accumulation has a definite bearing on the optimal domestic 
saving and investment policies of a developing country, and the optimal 
trajectories for these two variables over time should be determined simul­
taneously. In a system in which both net foreign capital inflow and domestic 
3 
savings are policy vari.s.bles, and hence total investment is allowed to vary, 
it is possible for domestic savings to act on an inter-temporal averag:l.ng 
device which offsets the consumption impact of variation in export earnings. 
We shall test whether or not this type of savings behavior influences the 
sensitivity of optimal debt accumulation to changes in the variance of export 
earnings. Further, we use a dynamic progrannning model to derive a closed­
form solution for the optimal feedback relationship between domesth sav::.,,gs 
and export earnings. 
Another objective of this paper :!.s to investigate the effect of making 
export output a variable which is influenced at least indirectly by economic 
policy. We consider cases in which both the price of exports and their 
production and/or sales level are uncertain. Our main results a.re tiaseci 
upon the assumption that the interest r~te on new debt depends on the level 
of total debt and GNP is a linear function of capital. We demonstrate that, 
given these assumptions, making both domestic savings and net foreign capital 
inflow policy variables will cause optimal debt accumulation to be independent 
When exportof uncertainty provided that the volume of exports is exogenous. 
production is endogenous the dampening effect of revenue uncertainty on 
foreign borrowing depends on parameterization of the utility function. 
In Part I, static systems are presented which relate consumption to 
real exports, the terms of trade, debt service payments, and domestic savings 
in two cases: (1) where the voltmte of exports is exogenous; and (2) where 
it is endogenous. In Parts II and III dynamic models based on these st~tic 
systems are developed and both two-period and T-period solutions are analyzed. 
In Part IV, we use existing empirical studies to test the rea.)-world 
I.. 
applicability of the assumptions on which the two models are based. We also cite 
evidence indicating that the direction of response to export-revenue fJuct.u-
ation in the case of several countries is consistent with that obtained 
from our optimizing model with exogenous exports. In the concluding section 
the results are sunnnarized. 
I. The Static Model 
The static model is based on the assumption that there are two commo­
dities. Good 1 is a primary product export, not domestically consumed, 
Good 2 is an import-competing commodity used for final investment and con­
sumption purposes. Suppose that the real wage expressed in terms of Good 
2, w(2) is subject to the constraint 
w(2) ~w<n 
where W(2) is an exogenously determined real minimum wage, and that th,-: 
economy is in competitive equilibrium, In addition, assume that there are 
two factors of production, capital and labor, and that there is constant 
returns to scale in production in the two sectors. Then, as Brecher [3] 
has shown, with constraint (1.1) binding, labor will be openly unemployed 
and the transformation surface will be linear in the region of incomplete 
specialization. The transformation surface in this region, corresponding 
to a given real minimum wage and aggregate capital stock K is depicted 
as T T in Figure 1. The variables measured along each of the axes in 
1 2 
this case represent the real value added of the commodity produced in a 
particular sector. 
5 
Given that good 2 is the numeraire commodity and the home country 
is a price taker in world trade with a variable export tax, both gross 
domestic product at internal prices and gross domestic product at world 
prices may be determined in the following manner. The ratio of the internal 
price of commodity 1 to that of commodity 2, p 
A 
, is uniquely determined 
by the specified real minimtnn wage as a result of the Samuelson relation­
ship between factor and relative commodity prices [5]. Hence there arE 
an infinite number of commodity price lines~ each having the slope -1/p. 
Denote the quantity produced and sold of the exported good by E. The 
commodity price line corresponding to the specified value of E, whose 
slope is determined by the real minimum wage, is depicted "'" in Figure.as pp 
1. It is clear that, under these conditions, GDP at internal prices, Q , 
1is given by the distance oa, on the horizontal axes. In algebraic 
terms this variable is a linear function of E and the aggregate capital 
stock K ; 
Q = aE + bK • (1.2) 
Denote the capital output ratio in the sector producing commodity i by 
z(i) . Then it can be shown that a= (p - z(l)/z(2)) and b = l/z(2) , 
where z(l)/z(2) is the inverse of the slope of the transformation surface. 
Brecher has shown that when the commodity measured along the vertical axes 
is relatively labor intense the absolute value of the slope transformation 
surface will be greater than that of the commodity price line. This implies 
1An increase in total capital stock from K to K will cause a r,r..r.':> :~. 
outward movement in the transformation surface from T T to
1 2 
T1T2 
that the export coefficient a will be positive. The export coeffid.£,nt 
will be negative in the case where the import-competing commodity, good 
2, is relatively labor intense. 
It is assumed that the home country is a price taker in world trade, 
and that the export tax or subsidy on good 1 determined by the difference 
between the constant internal price ratio, p, and the external commodity 
price ratio, P. Gross domestic product at world prices, Y, may be 
depicted as a distance ob along the horizontal axes in Figure l when good 
2 is the numeraire commodity. 
This variable is determined by the relationship 
Y = bK +[a+ (p - ;)]E = Q + (p - ~)E. 
Denote the average interest rate on debt by r and total debt (deflated 
by the price of good 2) by D. Then gross national product at world 
prices GNP is given by the identity 
Consumption C, may be determined as difference between gross national 
product at world prices and gross domestic saving S , or by the identity 
C =GNP+ F - I= Q + (p - p)E - rD + F - I (1.5) 
where F is net foreign capital inflow and I is gross investment (all 
expressed in terms of the numeraire commodity, good 2). 
This approach is reasonable in the case where the price of the eyN,...-t: 
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good 2 (investment and consumpti
on) 
FIGURE 1 
Transformation Surface and Comm
odity Price Lines 
8 
given. This is not true when control variables affect real output of good 
1. To formulate this latter case let the production function of sector 1 
take the form 
Q(l) = BF(K(i), L(l)) (1.6) 
where Q(l) is output, K(l) is capital stock, L(l) is employed labor 
in sector 1, and B is a multiplicative factor which could be random, e.g., re­
flecting the influence of weather on export output. Denote the wage rental 
ratio in both sectors by tu and the capital-labor ratio in sector 1 by 
k(l) • It can be shown that, given constant returns to scale and internal 
price certainty for commodity 1, the capital-labor ratio of the profit maxi­
mizing firm in sector 1 will still be determined by the relation 
f(k(l))
f'(k(l)) - k(l) = m 
where f(k(l)) = F(K(l)/L(l), 1) and f'(k(l)) = f' = oF/ok(l) 1 Since 
1In this case, the firm's objective function takes the form 
EU(PBF - wL - rK) 
where E is the expected value operator, U is the well-behaved utility
function, p is the exogenously given price and w and r are the labor 
wage and capital rental rates respectively. The first order-conditions yield 
Eu{PB I- r) = o 
EU' ( PB I -w) = 0 • 
From these relationships, (1. 7) may be obtained by assuming constant returns 
to scale. 
9 
with diminishing returns to scale, f"(k(l)) < 0, it can be shown that al-
~ > 0
dk 
ways holds and that k(l) is uniquely determined by the wage rental ratio 
of good 2).associated with the specified real wage (expressed in terms 
,. 
Consequently the capital labor ratio is independent of random parameter B 
However, the capital-output ratio is given by the expression 
k(l) A 
(1.8)Bf(k(l)) = Z(l) 
which depends on the random variable. Since the expression for the transfor­
mation surface relating output of good 2, Q(2) , to output of good 1, 
Q(l) , takes the form 
_ 1 zo)
Q( 2 ) - Z(2) K - Z(2) Q(l) 
the problem may be viewed as one in which the intercept of the transformation 
surface on the vertical axis changes but not on the horizontal axis as 
result of random variation in 
,.
B. When capital is allocated completely to 
,.
1sector 2, Q(2) =2(2) K which is independent of B • This type of pro-
duction variability is illustrated by the shift from T to TiT2 in1T2 
Figure 1. 
Under these conditions, it seems reasonable to assume that output 
of good 2 is specified but not good 1, since no uncertainty is associated 
with the production of the former connnodity and it is dubious that resources 
A 
move instantaneously into or out of sector 2 to compensate for changes in B. 
10 
Let ~ = 1/Z(l) , then the output of good 1 Q(l) is given by the 
formula 
Q(l) = K~ - Z(2)8Q(2) 
where Q(2) is specified output level of good 2. This formulation implies 
an expression for aggregate consumption of the form 
C = p~(K - Z(2)Q(2)) + Q{2) - S. 
The expression capital in sector 1, K(l) , is 
K - Z(2)Q(2) = K(l) 
· and K(l) is assumed to be positive. Therefore, a random increase in the 
output capital ratio in sector 1 will cause consumption to increase, with 
world relative commodity prices (P)· fixed, and vice versa. 
II. Dynamic Models with Exogenous Exports 
The optimal debt accumulation model is precisely analogous to Leland's 
optimal savings model for the household in the case where gross investment 
.is held constant, net foreign capital inflow is controlled, and uncertainty 
is confined to export revenues. Assume that E is exogenous, possibly 
random, and that P is a random variable with a fixed mean and a constant 
standard deviation ~ 
p 
Then we may derive a new random variable, ~ E , 
which is given by the function 
11 
E = (p - p)E + aE. (2.1) 
Since this function is linear in p with E constant, the standard devi-
ation of E is simply 1Ea • p 
The social welfare function for the two-period model takes the form 
(2.2) 
where ~ is the rate of sod al discount (ass'.l!!!ed constant), O> is the ex-
pected value operator, and the subscripts 1 ~nd 2 refer to consumption in 
the first and second time periods. The second utility function for each 
time period, U, is always restricted to meet the regularity conditions 
D'(C) > 0 and 1•· {G) < 0 • (2. 3) 
In the ·initial time period, P is kno,,m and E1 
is equal to a speci-
fied value, whereas the value of the expression in the second time period, 
-is uncertain. We assume not only that gross inv8stment per laborer 
in the initial time period (1 ) is fixed but also, without loss of generality,
1 
that gross investment is zero in the terminal period. The final assumption 
upon which our model is based is that the interest rate on new debt is an 
2 
.increasing function of total debt D. Asst.nning that world capital markets 
are imperfect in this sense is a way of capturing risk aversion on the part 
11£ E were random, 
Var(E) =·'p2cl- ~E2cl- +PEcov(P,E) + [EP+ cov(P,E)J2
E p 
2 - -2 ? 2 -2 2A+ 2(a-p)(c 2 - P(E +°E)) + (a-p)
A 
(E + O'E) 
-:,~,. r. 




of lendors. This assumption also implies that the average interest rate 
on total debt, r, is an increa~ing function of the total debt ratio, 
i.e., 
r = r(D) 
(2.1+) 
r' > 0 • 
Consequently, total interest payments are give~ by the function 
rD = r(D)•D = TI(D) , (2.5) 
the first derivative of which takes the form 
0 = r + r' (D)D > 0 • (2.6) 
The value of this expression represent" the amount by which an extra unit 
of debt raises the total cost of borrowing. 
1The optimization problem is one of choosing a value of net foreign 
capital inflow in the initial time period (F ) which maximizes
1 
(2. 7) 
The first order condition for the maximum in this case is simply 
(2.8) 
1we assume no labor force growth, at zero cost in generality. 
13 
where 0 = TT' (d) Denote the variance of ~E by (J~E 
2 
• Then from (2.8) 
it follows that dF/oof < 0 provided that the utility function exhibits 
decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
1 
This result breaks down int.he 2-period case when domestic savings 
rather than total investment is held fixed, and in the T as well as the 2-
period case when both domestic savings and net foreign capital inflow are 
allowed to vary. The 2-perio<l model with initial domestic saving, s1 , 
fixed and no savings in the terminal period takes the form 
The first order condition in this case is 
(2.10) 
which implies that b = '/J • In other words, one will accumulate debt until 
the incremental cost of borro~ing is equal to the constant social marginal 
product of capital, b. Here the debt accumulation is independent of export 
1
Absolute risk aversion is defined as -U"/U' , and can be interpreted as 
reflecting the individual's willingness to undertake a bet of fixed size. 
It is generally agreed that absolute risk aversion should decline with 
·wealth; a sufficient condition for this is that the third derivative of 
the utility function, U"' , be positive. In the present instance, this 
also guarantees the convexity of U' in l so that 
14 
revenue uncertainty as measured by °E'. This result also holds when s
1 
is allowed to vary in the two-period example. In that case, differentating 
the first-order conditions oL/os1 = 0 and oL/oF1 = 0 with respect to 
2err, with decreasing absolute risk aversion yields 
(2.11) 
Thus, when uncertainty increases, optimal sa·,11:ngs policy takes the form of 
shifting the mean of c to the right in order to compensate for its higher2 
variance. 
The T-period case may be analyzed by means of dynamic programming. 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that total capital stock financed 
by foreign debt (Kf) is controlled, rather than net foreign capital inflow. 
This variable should be distinguished from the stock of imported capital 
and in the case where the depreciation rate is zero, it is identically equal 
to foreign debt, D. Making this simplification affects nothing. 
We assume that capital financed by foreign debt (Kf) and capital 
financed by domestic savings (Kd) are homogenous factors of production. 
Given that the return on total capital is b, consumption in period t 
is given by the expression: 
C = b(Kd + Kf) + E - r D - S • (2.12)t t t t t t t 
Assume that welfare is intemporally additive with a constant social 
discount rate, and that the utility function is one with constant absolute 
15 
risk aversion of the form 
U(C) Ti < 0 J e = base of natural logarithms. (2 .13) 
In this case utility is always negative; but this is irrelevant since 
all we are concerned with is the ordering of preferences and the function 
is well behaved in the sense that the following regularity conditions are 
met: 
u' > fi 1 U" < 0 •V 
The assumption 0£ constant absolute risk aversion is objectionable 
in a portfolio choice model. However, since the value of export revenues 
is exogenous, th:!.s problem is not relevant here. In addition, for getting a 
closed solution to our problem, the constant absolute risk aversion formu­
lation is convenient. 
The planning authority's objective is to 








~ = ~ ' kF ' ~ , • • ., ~ >
T T-1 T-2 0 
The dynamic prograunning problem may be solved by starting first with 
the terminal period and then working back in time. Assuming that there is 
no domestic saving in this period, the end-period maximization is simply 
16 
(2.14) 
The first-order condition is simply ~ = b ; denote ,-1{b) 
and r~)•tc; by n*. The maximized value of utility in the end-period 




We notice t'har 2.?pear~ as a paraneter in the end-period problem; 





1 e e+ --
1+5 
r.;:;;.- (2.15)1'1 
The first-order condition for implies, as before that b = 0 , so 
independently of savings. The first order condition for 
ST-l can be solved for ST-l, giving us 
(2 .16)' 
Henceforth * will denote a,, optimal value. Since e i1E is convex in E 
and 'Tl < 0 J 
17 
> 0 • 
Also, we have a marginal propensity to save out of the period-to-period 
random draws Et of 1/l+b , or about .25 for most LDC's. Having 
we may write the maximized value of expected utility from periods T-1 
to T as 
= t3 (2 .17)1 
Where ~l can be determined from (2.16). 
Having J , we can now go back a period and1 
Again kF = kF* and the savings rule takes the same form as (2.16), with 
T-2 




-bE )b 1 
- ~e l+b l+b a = constant = ( 1+! lb 
The dynamic programming problem is to find s* such that 
'n[b(k +k*)+ bE ] 'n[b(k +k*)-n*+E-s*J 'n[B(k +k*+s*)+ bE l 
-1) F l+b D F - l D F l+b -e = e + 1::e~­,, ;;- 1+~ lorj 




1 ~e l+b b (b1+b + b - 1+b ) 
(2 .19)i1° ln ( l+~ • l+~ 
Again, 
Starting from the end period, when we specified zero savings, the 
savings function drifts up over time with a constant slope until the infinite­
horizon savings function (2.19) is reached. Throughout the planning period 
foreign-financed capital, KF, is at a constant level ~, independent 
of savings behavior and uncertainty. 
We can sum up the influence of export revenue uncertainty as follows: 
(a) F controlled, I fixed: 0F/oe1E2 < o 
2
(b) F controlled, s fixed: oF/ooE = o 
2 2
(c) F , S both controlled: oF/~ = 0, oS/o~ > 0 
(d) F , I controlled: oF/ooE2 I: 0 , oI/OO'E2 ,j:. 0 signs unclear. 
19 
In cases (a)-(c) the effect of policy response to increased export uncer­
tainty is to shift over the mean of the distribution of future consumption 
in order to compensate for its increased variance; case (d) is ambiguous. 
In addition, it can be shown, in (a), that oF/oK < 0 and oS/o'[ > 0; 
in other words as the current realized value of E rises, optimal savings 
rises, and foreign borrowing falls. 
Fe should emphasize what features of the models lead to the result 
that with S fi.xed or controlled, foreign bc.:-rowing is independent of un-
certainty; recall that 
If we draw the "opportunity locus" in mean-variance space facing the country 
... 
for different values of F, we see that it is vertical; varying F affects 
only its height (which is maximized when b = 0 ). Since, therefore, foreign 
2 2capital inflow leaves (J unaffected) dF/d~ is zero. Thus, it was crucial 
C 





Another essential element is the constancy of b , the marginal pro-
duct of capital. With decreasing returns to capital, the equilibrium level 
of debt is not uniquely detennined by D independent of K • In the latter 
case the effects on F on c are intertwined with those of S, and1 2 
net foreign capital inflow is affected by er~E 
2 
'
. here the fact that both 
F and s constitute additions to capital stock is relevant.1 1 
Finally, the assumption that r' (D) > 0 allows b = '/J ; with the 
interest rate constant, despite ~ E being exogenous and b mixed, uncertainty 
will affect foreign borrowing. Therefore imperfect capital markets and/or 
risk aversion by lending countries is crucial. 
We should note very briefly that although with investment fixed in­
creased export revenue uncertainty does cause less foreign borrowing, this 
does not imply that multilateral commodity price stabiliza"t:ion would raise 
foreign borrowing; as we defined E, 







Clearly, with highly negatively correlations between the internatiorial price 
and output of the export good, a rise in er p can stabilize income, since 
fluctuations in prices would offset fluctuations in output. Quite conceivably, 
then, price stabilization, brought about by an international agreement, 
could lower the optimal level of foreign borrowing. This highly negative 
correlation between international price and domestic output would be most 
likely to occur in a country whose normal output of t'!-ie eY.port commo1i.1·:,· 
is large relative to total world production. Therefore, the response of 
optimal borrowing to price stabilization will be less positive, the greater 
control the country has over the price of its export~ 
III. Variable Export Volume 
We recall the alternative definition of consumption given in Part I: 
C = P9(k - z(2)q(2)) + q(2) - s - rd • 
Throughout this section we fix q (2) , the domestic production of the im-
,._ 
portable, so that exports will vary according to the random variable e 
and the capital stock K. 
Let us take the simple cases where savings are fixed and net foreign 
capital inflow, f, is controlled; when the volume of real exports was 
fixed, we got oF/ocrf = 0 in this case. Again, 
The first order condition is 
22 
Clearly foreign borrowing is now affected by uncertainty. Specifically, 
treating F as an implicit function of 
_L (EU'P9 - 0EU')




Looking at the numerator, U' is convex in P9 " given decreasing absolute 
risk aversion, so oEU' /oo;9 > 0 • The der:i_v:;tive of EU' P9 with re2pc:::t 
2to crpe is harder; to get a handle on the convexity or concavity of 
,. 




C i1 < 1 .
'Tl ' 
If we define U'P9 = H(P9), 
We have then, a sufficient condition for convexity or concave of H(P9) 
,. {11>0H"(P9) < 0 if 
q (2) - rd > 0 
,.. {,, < 0 
H"(P9) > 0 if 
q (2) - rd < 0 . 
1Relative risk aversion defined as -U"•c/u', can be interpreted as re­
flecting t,he individual's willingness to undertake a bet involving a fixed 
proportion of his wealth. 
23 
,..
The sign of the derivative of EU'P9 depends, then, not only on a specific 
type of utility function, but on the parameterization of that utility func­
tion; and on the sign q(2) - rd, which one would generally assume to be 
positive, since C = P9(•) + q(2) - rd, and even with an extensive export 
shortfall, countries show positive consumption. 
Assuming ~ 2 0 and q(2) - rd> 0, we have 
and 
oEU'P9 _ 0 
2 00'2"
dF _a_a_P_e~___P_B<O 
d_a_;_e = ~EU' - EU"(P9>2 
It is possible, then, to get the dampening effect traditionally imputed to 
2export revenue uncertainty; but had we let ~ < 0, the sign of dF/daPe 
would be ambiguous; we could easily have a case where export revenue un­
certainty increased foreign borrowing. 
If we control investment, our problem is 
Implying: 
oL 1 t! " au = -u' + l+~ G>U'Pe = o 
01 = u' - 0 1\ t.u' = o .af 1 +v 
24 
2Differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to crpe and solving 
the resulting system, we find that 
(+) (+) 




oEU' 0 10 -2- 2 
oope" oFdI 1-y- = -----------,--J-.-------...... < 0 
dcrp§ 
jJj = detenninant of the Jacobian; jJj > 0. This, again, asstnnes 
constant relative risk aversion with ~ 2: 0 and q(2) - rd> u. Clearly 
with ~ < 0 we could get the opposite result. 
We have seen, then, that the dampening effect of export revenue un­
certainty is critically dependent on the specific parameterization of the 
utility function, and is certainly not a general result. 
There is, however, a more fundamental question involved here: why 
does uncertainty matter at all? In these previous sections we found that 
for two of the four tableaux considered, ~ = b in dependently of uncertainty; 
now in this section the equivalent symbol to b, 9 is random, but even if 
it weren't, our results would be unchanged, even with savings controlled, 
25 
which led to dF/d°E = 0 previously. If we simplify by considering this 
a mean-variance problem, the opportunity locus facing the country if the 
value of exports is exogenous is a vertical line; borrowing, as we said above, 
affects only the height of the line, leaving the variance of consumption 





If q(2) is controlled or exogenous, changing f does affect the 
probability distribution of export revenues, since borrowing augments capital 
stock and 
e,cvalue of exports) =~ (P9 )(K - z (2 )q (2)) 
2 --2Var(value of exports) = crp9(K - z(2)q(2)) 
If we draw the opportunity locus f~r this case we have the line 00 
in the figure below; the equilibrium point is A, from which can be deduced 
the optimal values of I and F • Changing F rotates the locus to 00' 
' 
leading to a new equilibrium point A' • Net foreign capital inflow affects 
26 
the slope and height of the opportunity locus, so uncertainty should be 




A further point to be made is that price stabilization does not 




-= 0 as 
ocrp < 
,. 
(p = correlation coefficient between P and 9 ). Thus, 
2 
dF dF dcrP0 <--=  asdcrp = ,. dcrp >do-Pe 
Again, one would expect to find price stabilization dampening foreign borrowing, 
where the country is important in world production of the export commodity. 
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I TT Preliminary Empirical Testing 
The basic difference between the system analyzed in Part II and 
V • 
that analyzed in Part III concerns whether or not the volume of ex
ports 
Massel [8] in his empirical investiga­is influenced by economic policy. 
tion of export instability assumes that economic policy does not in
flu­
ence the size of the export sector. This may well be true in a la
rge 
nwnber of countries where food and raw material based exports sect
ors 
are financed through foreign direct investment. There is evidence
, 
however, that in a few developing countries, export promotion schem
es 
have been employed successfully [ 4 J. One of these schemes has been 
the extension of long-term loans to the export sector at subsidize
d rates. 
In this way Q2 is reduced by increasing t
he absolute amount of total cap-
1
ital allocated to the export sector. 
In ~ost LDC's, therefore, the model analyzed in Section II where th
e 
volume of exports is exogenous, though random, seems to be more ap
plicable 
than that presented in Section III where the proportion of total c
apital 
But cer•tain other f"""Y"!~+-t 1""1::1 i-.J..-L\....L ............. ~allo"cated to the export sector is controlled. 
assumptions applicable to both systems should be analyzed in the li
ght 
of the available empirical evidence. The first is the assumption 
that 
the exported commodity is not domestically consumed. This assumpt
ion 
seems to be most valid in the case of raw materials primary produc
t exports 
such as copper and oil. Linder has argued that industrial exports
 involve 
for the most part only those commodities which are domestically co
nsumed; 
1A precise formulation involving policy instruments which determine
 
the size of the export sector will be considered in a separate pap
er. 
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howevsr, i1' :nos--::. developing countries the industrial export share of 
total exports is very small. It is true, of course, that a significant 
proportion of the total production of certain food commodities, used for 
export purposes, is consumed domestically. But less than 50 percent of 
the develoi;:,ing countries in Massel's sample domestically consumed more 
than 50 percent of the domestic production of these comrnodities [ 8 J. 
Mor•eover, the share of food exports domestically consumed did not prove 
to be significant explanatory variable determining the degree of export 
reve-:--1°.w vaTiation ir1 the colUltries. Matheson and McKinnon [9 J have 
collectec". rlatct which indicates that the variance of GDP at domestic prices, 
adjusted fen~ a time trend, is greater in the developing than it is in 
the developed countr>ies. Further, theiP regression analysis indicates 
that thex·e is a negative correlation between the real export GDP ratio 
and the degree of export variability. However, these results are not 
inconsistent with those implied by the formulations developed in this 
paper; Matheson and McKinnon do not attempt to explain the variance of 
GDP at world prices, and there is evidence that a great deal of export 
revenue variability is attributable to fluctuations in the terms of 
trade, arising from shifts in the demand schedule, rather than production 
instability in the export sector [8]. Co:1sequently, our simplifying 
assumptions, along with presumed association of consumption with export­
revenue variability, are for the most part supported by the available 
empirical studies. 
The closed form solution derived from the dynamic programming model 
indicates that level of domestic savings is an increasing function of ex­
port revenues. In other words, along the optimal trajectory, declines in 
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dcr;., :_;t.::_r: sav-ings serve to neutralize the consumption impact of export 
reve,rne shcr•tfalls and increases in domestic savings are associated 
wi :::, rises in export revenues above normal levels. This is consistent 
wi tL ')a:-iek' s empirical results for Columbia which uses the terms of 
tro.::h,, not export revenues, to explain savings and Maizels' study of 
12 cv.mtries, 8 developing and 4 developed, [7] and [13]. The regressi
on 
ecma t: .i ,)r,_ for domestic savings involves two independent variables, the 
vc,J1~ne of exports and GDP at constant prices. In Vanek' s study, there 
appt::,,···:e t::: be 2 significant positive association between domestic 
sav.i.ri:o and the terms of trade (defined as the ratio of the world price
 
Maizels' study indicates
(.>f- r:::-:pc2ts to the world price of imports): 
tl--,a.t· c1omestic savings are for the most part positively correlated with 
eJ,< volume of exports. Although their specification is not identical 
to equation (2.10), the estimated regression equations do imply a 
direction of association which is consistent with the closed-form sol-
ution. 
Weisskopf's time series regressions for 17 developing countries 
include GDP, exports, and net foreign capital inflow, all in real 
terms, as independent variables [14]. Since a common GDP price deflator
 
is used to derive these variables from the expenditure components of 
GDP measured in current terms, changes in the export variable are to a 
degree attributable to changes in the world price of the commodity. 
In lO of the 17 countries, the export coefficient is significantly 
positive at the five percent level for the post-war periods examined. 
Aside from this result, there is in most cases a significant negative 
!. 
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association between net foreign capital inflow and domestic savings. 
The sign of this, as well as the export, coefficient is consistent with 
the optimization model presented in Part I when gross domestic invest­
ment is fixed. Under these conditions, net foreign capital inflow and 
domestic savings react in opposite directions to period-to-period fluctua­
tions in export revenues (which are not completely captured by 
Weisskopf I s export variable). If, on the other hand, net foreign 
capital inflow is exogenous along with export revenues and gross in-
vestment endogenous, as Weisskopf assumes, the partial derivative of 
saving with respect to net foreign capital inflow will be negative 
according to our model provided that b > ¢. In this case of exogenous net 
foreign capital inflow, the partial derivative of domestic savings with 
respect to export revenues will again be positive at least in the two­
period model. In sum, thenj under two alternative sets of assumptions 
about exogenous variables, Weisskopf's savings function estimates 
qualitatively conform to the optimal behavior implied by our models. 
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Conclusions 
1. The usual assumption that export revenue uncertainty should 
dampen foreign borrowing does not hold generally. Indeed, if exports 
are exogenous, as they probably are in a number of LDC's, in our system 
foreign borrowing should proceed to th~ point where the marginal cost 
of borrowing(~) is equal to the social marginal product of capital (b), 
independently of uncertainty. 
2. To amplify this last point, if exports are exogenous, foreign 
borrowing affects only the expected value of consumption, and none of 
its higher moments. Thus, uncertainty will not affect foreign borrowing. 
3. Even in the cases where export revenue uncertainty can be shown 
to have a dampening effect on foreign borrowing, if the country is a 
large exporter, it can happen that international price stabilization 
will destablize export revenues if output uncertainty is present, and 
dampen optimal net foreign capital inflow. 
4. Having derived a closed solution for optimal savings behavior 
using dynamic programming, we noted that it was consistent with ob­
served behavior in several developing countries, at least as regards 
the direction of response of this variable to export fluctuation. To 
the extent that this is a consequence of the use of export taxes as 
major source of government revenues, reliance on such an indirect tax re­
gime will beeconomically efficient according to the exogenous-export 
model presented in part II. However, it must be noted that this conclusion 
is critically dependent on the assumption that random fluctuation in 
the level of investment is costless. 
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5. The level of foreign exchange reserves is not included as policy 
variable in the models. Working out the case where the average inter­
est rate on debt is a decreasing function of this variable, as well as 
an increasing function of debt, would be tedious. It can be easily shown 
that such a modification will not affect the qualitative response to 
parameter changes in the case of the model presented in Part II, provided 
that interest return on exchange reserves is constant and less than the 
marginal product of capital in the borrowing country. 
6. In the first models it is true (a) that savings and net foreign 
capital inflow react in opposite directions to period-to-period fluctua­
tions in the value of exports with investment fixed; and (b) that, 
with investment allowed to vary, optimal domestic saving is a decreasing 
function of a given level of net foreign capital inflow. This is con­
sistent with cross-sectional findings by Weisskopf [14]. With exports 
affected by government policy, as is the case in Part III, this result 
may not hold. 
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